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INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Malaysia

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SUBJECT Weaknesses in British Conduct of Anti-Communist
Campaign in Malaya
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1. The military forces now available to the British in Malaya are capable of winning the Government's campaign against militant Communism. If Government forces would provide the people of Malaya with greater security against Communist terrorism, they would not only contribute substantially to the campaign, but would resist less violent appeals of the Communists for popular support.
2. There are at least two weaknesses slowing up the present campaign against Communism that could be corrected. The first of these is the fact that the rubber interests are not contributing their share of support for the campaign. In view of the unprecedented profits which rubber interests are now making, this support should be contributed readily. The Government is partially to blame for this lack of support, since it has not required more active participation of rubber interests in the campaign.
3. An example of this lack of support is the fact that undergrowth has not been cleared from along the borders of rubber estates and from the edges of their internal roads. Tappers and other employees of the rubber estates should be resettled in a manner similar to that used with the squatters. This would prevent their giving support to guerrillas from outlying labor lines. The Government could enforce these measures without difficulty, but it has not done so.
4. The second weakness in the present campaign is the fact that police and military specialists have been brought to Malaya from outside while the full capabilities of persons available in Malaya has not been utilized. Although outside specialists are useful, their special abilities have not been coordinated with those of personnel with more background in Malaya. These specialists have required even more time to become familiar with local conditions because they have been given too much authority.
5. Because some of these newcomers have not demonstrated a basic interest in Malaya, they have not won the support of capable Asiatic groups and individuals who were loyal to veteran officials.

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